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3 Commons Library Briefing, 18 November 2016 
Summary 
This briefing sets out the background to the 2016 Autumn Statement which will take 
place on Wednesday 23 November 2016. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) will 
publish revised forecasts for the economy and public finances on the same day.   
Economic situation 
The EU referendum has so far had little effect on overall economic growth. Consumer 
spending has continued to underpin growth, while business investment has been weak. 
Forecasts for growth, however, are less optimistic. The steep fall in the pound following 
the referendum has increased import prices. This is starting to impact on prices along the 
supply chain. Economists expect the result to be consumer price inflation rising above 2% 
by mid-2017, and closer to 3% by end-2017.  
Higher inflation would reduce the purchasing power of consumers, potentially leading to 
slower growth in their spending. This is expected to lead to more modest GDP growth in 
2017 despite a potential boost to exports from sterling’s decline. Growth forecasts from 
private sector economists for 2018-2020 have also been lowered since the Budget in 
March the EU referendum. As a result, we can expect the OBR to lower its growth 
forecasts as well. 
Brexit-related uncertainty and prospects for lower growth led the Bank of England to cut 
interest rates in August. The Bank has also expanded its quantitative easing programme, 
whereby it creates new money in order to buy financial assets from financial institutions. 
Public finances 
In 2015/16 the government had to borrow £76 billion to make up the difference between 
its spending and income. Despite halving since its 2009/10 peak the UK’s borrowing – 
often referred to as the deficit – remains large relative to other nations.   
Since the EU referendum, forecasters have increased their forecasts for government 
borrowing in response to predictions of lower economic growth. The OBR are expected to 
do the same. 
At over 80% of GDP, public sector net debt – largely the stock of borrowing arising from 
past deficits – remains relatively high by recent and international standards. The OBR’s 
March 2016 forecast saw the debt-to-GDP ratio falling each year. Forecasts made, by 
other forecasters, since the EU referendum have cast some doubt over whether the debt-
to-GDP ratio will fall in each of the next five years.  
New fiscal targets 
The Chancellor is set to drop, or amend, at least one of the Government’s three targets 
for the public finances in the Autumn Statement. The target to eliminate borrowing by 
2019/20 – in other words, to reach a budget surplus – was abandoned following the EU 
referendum and is likely to be replaced. The Chancellor may also take the opportunity to 
change the debt target and welfare cap, both of which have already been breached.  
The Chancellor has not said anything definitive on what the new targets might be. 
However, he has discussed some wider objectives for fiscal policy that the targets may 
reflect. The Chancellor: still wants to seek a budget surplus in the future; wants to control 
day-to-day spending and debt; and, may seek to find ‘headroom’ for a fiscal stimulus if 
the economy needs one. A fiscal stimulus would see the government increase spending or 
reduce taxes with the aim of stimulating economic growth.  
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Infrastructure 
Many economists and industry bodies have been calling for the Government to increase 
spending on infrastructure. These calls are made against the backdrop of historically low 
government borrowing costs.  
Infrastructure looks a likely candidate for additional spending if the Chancellor thinks the 
economy needs a fiscal stimulus. The Chancellor has indicated that he sees the need for 
some targeted and time-limited increases in this area of spending. 
Other information  
The Government is expected to publish the Low Pay Commission’s report on the National 
Minimum Wage on the same day as the Autumn Statement.  
The Library will publish an Autumn Statement edition of economic indicators on  
22 November 2016. 
The Government has said it will publish a National Shipbuilding Strategy by the Autumn 
Statement. Further information is available in library briefing paper The Royal Navy's new 
frigates and the National Shipbuilding Strategy. 
 
The Office for National Statistics will publish Public Sector Finances for October 2016 on 
22 November. The Library will summarise the key data in our briefing Public Finances: Key 
Economic Indicators.  
The Library will publish a summary of the Autumn Statement on the evening of  
23 November.  
Look out for Autumn Statement related blogs on the Library’s blog, Second Reading. 
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1. Economic situation 
Summary 
Overall economic growth has so far proved to be little affected by the EU referendum. 
Quarterly GDP growth of 0.5% seen in the three months following the vote was the same as 
the average recorded since 2012. Consumer spending has continued to underpin growth, 
while business investment has been weak. 
Forecasts for growth, however, are less optimistic. The steep fall in the pound following the 
referendum – down by 13% since then and 17% compared with a year ago – has increased 
import prices. This is starting to impact on prices along the supply chain. Economists expect 
the result to be consumer price inflation rising from its current rate of 0.9% to above 2% by 
mid-2017, and closer to 3% by end-2017.  
Higher inflation would reduce the purchasing power of consumers and, in turn, likely lead to 
slower growth in their spending. Given that economic growth has been dependent on 
consumers, this is expected to lead to more modest GDP growth in 2017 (the latest consensus 
forecast is 1.1%) despite a potential boost to exports from sterling’s decline. Growth forecasts 
from private sector economists for 2018-2020 have also been lowered since the Budget in 
March and the EU referendum. As a result, we can expect the OBR to lower its growth 
forecasts as well. 
Brexit-related uncertainty and prospects for lower growth led to the Bank of England cutting 
interest rates from 0.5% to 0.25% in early August. The Bank also expanded its quantitative 
easing programme, whereby it creates new money in order to buy financial assets from 
financial institutions, from £375 billion to £445 billion (including £10 billion of corporate 
debt). 
1.1 Recent growth 
In the three months following the 23 June vote to leave the European 
Union, the economy continued to grow in line with its pre-referendum 
performance. Quarterly GDP growth of 0.5% in Q3 20161 was faster 
than many had expected, particularly when compared with forecasts 
made in the run-up to the referendum and in its immediate aftermath.2   
                                                                                             
1  Q3 refers to the third quarter of the year: the three-month period of July-September. 
2  A survey of economists by Consensus Economics in September found that the 
consensus forecast was for a small contraction in Q3 2016 GDP. A survey by 
Bloomberg shortly after the referendum found that 71% of economists expected a 
recession (two successive quarters of negative growth) following Brexit – almost all 
expected this to be in 2016 or 2017. 
Post-referendum 
GDP growth was 
0.5% in Q3 2016.  
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Compared with the same quarter a year ago, GDP growth was 2.3% – 
the largest increase since Q2 2015. Full-year growth in 2016 is now 
expected to be around 2%, compared with 2.2% in 2015 and 3.1% in 
2014.3 
Quarterly growth in Q3 2016 came exclusively from the services sector 
(which accounts for almost 80% of GDP), with output increasing by 
0.8% on the previous quarter. All other sectors of the economy saw 
their output fall: construction declined by 1.4%; industrial production 
fell by 0.4% and agriculture was down by 0.4%.  
This reinforced the trend since the 2008/09 recession of strong growth 
in the services sector compared with weakness in construction and 
manufacturing. Output in the services sector is now 12.1% above its 
pre-recession peak level of early 2008. In contrast, output in the 
construction sector is 1.3% below its pre-recession level and in 
industrial production it is 8.2% lower.  
 
 
                                                                                             
3  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
16 November 2016 
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1.2 Interest rates and monetary policy 
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut its main 
interest rate (the Base Rate) from 0.5% to 0.25% on 4 August 2016, 
the first change since March 2009. The MPC cited its forecasts (at that 
time) of a markedly weaker growth outlook in the short to medium 
term, following the vote to leave the EU, as the reason for loosening 
monetary policy. 
 
As well as cutting interest rates, the MPC agreed a series of other 
measures designed to boost the economy, including expanding its 
quantitative easing (QE) programme, whereby the Bank creates new 
money to buy financial assets from financial institutions, by £70 billion 
(£60 billion of government debt and £10bn of corporate debt). Planned 
QE now totals £445 billion (£435 billion of government debt and £10 
billion of corporate debt). The MPC also introduced the Term Funding 
Scheme, designed to ensure banks pass on the interest rate cut by 
giving them access to cheap loans linked to the amount they lend to 
firms and households. The scheme is funded from newly-printed money 
up to a total of £100 billion.4 
The MPC’s efforts to bolster confidence and stimulate demand in the 
economy have generally been viewed positively, particularly given the 
uncertainty surrounding the possible implications of Brexit on the 
economy. Some, though, regard its actions as unnecessary given 
evidence that growth was, it turned out, healthy over this period.5 
At its early November meeting, the MPC unanimously agreed to leave 
policy unchanged. It updated its economic forecasts to show stronger 
near-term growth but weaker growth over the medium term, and raised 
its inflation forecasts (compared to its previous forecasts made in 
August). Growth forecasts are still well down on the MPC’s last pre-
referendum forecasts from May, however. 
                                                                                             
4  Bank of England, Monetary policy summary, 3 November 2016  
5  For example, City AM, “As recession fears fade following strong services PMIs, was 
the Bank of England wrong to cut interest rates post-Brexit?”, 5 September 2016 
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The MPC provided guidance that although inflation is forecast to rise 
above its 2% target (see section below) it will leave rates unchanged as 
it expects the sterling-related boost to inflation to prove temporary. 
However, it did warn that “there are limits to the extent to which 
above-target inflation can be tolerated” if, for example, inflation 
expectations started to rise.6 For the time being though, the MPC is 
keeping its options open, noting pithily that “monetary policy can 
respond, in either direction, to changes to the economic outlook”.7 
1.3 Exchange rates and inflation 
As of 15 November 2016, the pound has fallen by 13% against a 
basket of the UK’s main trading partners’ currencies since the EU 
referendum, and by 17% compared with a year ago (see chart below).8 
Against the US dollar, sterling is 16% lower than at the time of the 
referendum, while against the euro it is down by 11%. 
The decline in the pound makes it more expensive for those in the UK to 
purchase imported goods and services that are denominated in foreign 
currencies. 
                                                                                             
6  Bank of England, Monetary policy summary, 3 November 2016 
7  Bank of England, Monetary policy summary, 3 November 2016 
8  This is the Sterling Exchange Rate Index measuring sterling’s value against a ‘basket’ 
of currencies, ‘trade-weighted’ (based on currencies’ relative importance in UK 
trade). Data are from the Bank of England 
Bank of England forecasts for real GDP growth, 2016-19
Annual % change in real GDP
2016 2017 2018 2019
May 2016 forecast 2.0 2.3 2.3 ..
August 2016 forecast 2.0 0.8 1.8 ..
November 2016 forecast 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.6
%-point change from May to Nov +0.2 -0.9 -0.8 ..
%-point change from Aug to Nov +0.2 +0.6 -0.3 ..
Note: Difference between projections may not equal the change figure due to rounding
The May and August Inflation Reports did not contain a 2019 GDP forecast
Source: Bank of England, Inflation Report, May 2016, Aug 2016 and Nov 2016
The pound has 
fallen by 13% since 
the referendum, 
raising import 
prices. 
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Fall in the pound feeding through into higher producer prices 
The fall in the pound has already led to producer input prices rising in 
recent months. This reflects prices of materials and fuels bought by UK 
manufacturers for processing. In October producer input prices were 
12.2% higher than a year ago, up from 7.3% in September. Imported 
items (including oil) accounted for most of this: 10.5%-points of the 
12.2% increase. 
This is unsurprising, given that most commodities (including oil) are 
traded on world markets and priced in dollars. Therefore a fall in the 
pound leads to higher imported commodity prices in sterling. Of course, 
changes in the price of the commodities themselves are also important.  
 
Price pressures in the next stage of the supply chain are also increasing, 
though not by as much. Producer output prices – the prices that UK 
manufacturers charge for their goods – went up by 2.1% in October 
compared with a year ago, up from 1.3% in September. As the Office 
for National Statistics noted, this “would suggest higher input costs are 
feeding into the output prices of manufacturing goods”.9 
                                                                                             
9  ONS, UK producer price inflation: Oct 2016, 15 November 2016 
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Producers may not pass on all of these higher costs to other companies 
further up the production chain. What they do will depend on the 
company’s other costs (wages for example), as well as its ability and 
desire to pass these costs on. Similarly, retailers may not pass on the full 
cost on to consumers, accepting lower profit margins to preserve 
market share. 
In addition, the full impact of higher import prices will not be immediate 
as some firms will have agreed contracts to pay a fixed price for their 
imports; only when those contracts expire and new contracts are 
negotiated will the full impact be felt. Businesses may also protect 
against short-term movements in the exchange rate by hedging their 
exposure to such changes via financial products. 
Consumer prices have not yet felt the impact, but are expected to 
Consumer prices have risen in recent months, with the CPI measure 
0.9% higher in October compared with a year ago, slightly down from 
1.0% in September but up from 0.5% in June. This increase is mostly a 
result of higher energy prices – due to sterling’s fall and rising dollar oil 
prices – and also the statistical effects of the previous year’s oil price 
decline dropping out of the annual calculation.10 
Looking ahead, economists expect rising producer prices to feed 
through into higher consumer price inflation. In a recent survey, the 
average forecast of economists was for annual CPI inflation to rise to 
2.7% in the final quarter of 2017.11 
The Bank of England expects it to take several years for higher import 
costs to be fully passed through to consumer prices. It forecasts CPI 
inflation to rise to 2.4% in Q2 2017 and peak at 2.8% in the first half 
of 2018, before easing to 2.5% by the end of 2019.12 
 
                                                                                             
10  The “base effect” – a year ago oil prices were ‘low’ and lower than the previous 
year, reducing the overall inflation rate; they are now higher compared with the 
‘low’ price of a year ago, raising the overall inflation rate. 
11  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
16 November 2016 
12  Bank of England, Inflation Report: November 2016, current fan chart data 
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1.4 Consumers 
Low inflation since the end of 2014 has underpinned strong growth in 
real (inflation-adjusted) incomes, despite modest increases in average 
earnings. In 2015, real household disposable income per head grew by 
2.5% – the most since 2001. This supported consumer spending 
growth of 2.6% in 2015, and was the most important element 
contributing to overall GDP growth of 2.2%. The first half of 2016 also 
saw robust consumer spending growth of 2.9% compared with the 
year before. 
 
Consumers appear to have made little change to their spending 
patterns following the EU referendum. While we don’t yet have official 
data on overall consumer spending post-referendum, many indicators 
point to continued robust expenditure growth: 
• retail sales growth has been strong, up 5.9% in volume terms in 
in the 3 months to October 2016 compared with the year 
before;13 
• new car registrations have increased;14 
• the housing market has been resilient, with prices rising by nearly 
8% in Q3 2016 compared with a year earlier;15  
• consumer confidence is upbeat, after an initial drop following the 
referendum.16 
                                                                                             
13  ONS, Retail sales in Great Britain: Oct 2016, 20 October 2016 
14  SMMT, Car registrations data 
15  ONS, House Price Index: Sept 2016, 15 November 2016 
16  GfK for European Commission, Consumer confidence index, 28 October 2016  
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Summarising the data in early November, Bank of England Governor 
Mark Carney said consumers were “appearing to entirely look through 
Brexit-related uncertainties”.17 However, the outlook for consumer 
spending – which accounts for over 60% of GDP – is more uncertain. 
The anticipated rise in inflation is expected to reduce the purchasing 
power of consumers, with growth in real (inflation-adjusted) incomes 
slowing in 2017. This, in turn, is expected to lead to consumer spending 
being reined in: the latest average forecast is for a 1.1% increase in 
2017, compared with 2.7% in 2016.18 
1.5 Labour market 
Employment and unemployment  
Employment in the UK is at a record high in 2016: 31.8 million people 
were in work in the three months July-September. The employment rate 
among people aged 16-64 was 74.5%, compared with 73.0% in early 
2008 before the economic downturn.19 
1.6 million people were unemployed and the unemployment rate was 
4.8%, the lowest rate since mid-2005.  
 
                                                                                             
17  Mark Carney, Inflation report press conference: Opening remarks by the Governor, 
Bank of England, 3 November 2016 
18  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
16 November 2016 
19  Employment and unemployment data from ONS UK Labour Market, November 2016 
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Employment has grown strongly since 2012 but data for recent months 
signal the pace of growth is slowing. The number of people in work in 
July-September 2016 was 49,000 higher than in the previous quarter, 
while the employment rate held steady. Although figures suggest that 
unemployment fell over the last quarter (by 37,000), the number of 
people claiming unemployment benefits has been rising gradually since 
early 2016.  
Earnings 
Average weekly earnings have been increasing in real terms since late 
2014 (i.e. increasing more quickly than prices, partly thanks to price 
inflation being very low), after a sustained real terms fall over the 
previous six years. 
Excluding bonuses, average weekly pay increased by 1.7% in real terms 
in the year to July-September 2016. This is weaker than the rate of 
growth seen before the economic downturn: on average, between 
2001 and 2007 average weekly pay excluding bonuses grew by 2.3% 
per year in real terms.20  
 
Although the average level of pay may not be growing as quickly as 
before the downturn, the introduction of the National Living Wage in 
April 2016, set at an initial rate of £7.20 an hour for employees aged 25 
and over, led to a sharp rise in pay among the lowest earning 
employees. 5% of full-time employees earned less than £279 per week 
in April 2016, up from £263 in 2015 – an increase of 6.2% (not 
adjusted for inflation). By comparison, pay at the middle of the earnings 
distribution for full-time employees (i.e. the median value) went up by a 
more modest 2.2% over the same period.21  
The Government is expected to publish the Low Pay Commission’s 
report recommending the value of the National Minimum Wage for 
different age groups (including the National Living Wage) from 
April 2017 on the same day as the Autumn Statement, 23 November. 
                                                                                             
20  ONS Average Weekly Earning series (series codes KAI9 and A2FA) 
21  ONS, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2016, Figure 5 
Note: three month average. Source: ONS UK Labour Market, November 2016
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1.6 Business investment 
In contrast to consumers, businesses appear to be more circumspect in 
their reaction to the referendum outcome. While official data on 
business investment for the period after the referendum is not yet 
available, surveys point to weakening investment intentions among 
firms, continuing a trend seen since the beginning of the year.22   
Official business investment data was already weak prior to the 
referendum (possibly due to uncertainty related to it), declining by 0.8% 
in the first half of 2016 compared with a year earlier. This compares to 
growth of 5.0% in 2015. As a result, forecasts for business investment 
in 2016 and 2017 have been lowered.23 
1.7 Trade and current account 
The UK’s current account balance – the trade balance plus the balance 
of income and transfers moving into and out of the UK – has 
deteriorated in recent years. In 2015, the current account deficit was 
£100 billion, equivalent to 5.4% of GDP. This is the highest annual 
figure since records began in 1948. The current account deficit with the 
EU was £109 billion in 2015 while the UK ran a surplus of £9 billion 
with non-EU countries. 
The main reason for the rise in the deficit is not the trade deficit (the 
difference between exports and imports) which was a relatively modest 
2.1% of GDP in 2015. More important is the worsening primary 
balance that measures flows of profits, dividends and interest between 
the UK and abroad. The primary balance was in surplus every year 
between 2000 and 2011, peaking at 2.4% of GDP in 2005. It went into 
deficit in 2012 and the deficit was 2.0% of GDP in 2015. There has 
been some improvement in recent quarters with the primary account 
deficit falling from 3.2% of GDP in Q4, 2015 to 2.1% in Q2, 2016. The 
average independent forecast is for the current account deficit to be 
£106.8 billion in 2016 falling to £80.9 billion in 2017.24 These are both 
higher than the OBR’s March 2016 forecast of a deficit of £80.3 billion 
in 2016 and £75.1 billion in 2017.25 
                                                                                             
22  Bank of England, Inflation Report, November 2016, p13, p16 and chart 2.5 
23  For example, EY ITEM Club, Autumn forecast, October 2016 and ICAEW, UK 
Economic forecast Q3 2016 among others 
24  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
November 2016 
25  OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2016, Table 3.5 
The business 
investment outlook 
has deteriorated. 
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The pound has depreciated significantly since the EU referendum. In the 
past, depreciations have boosted exports by making them more 
competitive (and imports less competitive). It is too early to say whether 
the recent fall in sterling’s value has had this effect. There is also 
uncertainty over how large any effect might be. The Bank of England 
has commented that “net trade – exports less imports – will be sensitive 
to how companies anticipate and respond to possible future changes in 
the United Kingdom’s trading arrangements.”26 
1.8 Growth outlook 
The economy’s resilience following the EU referendum, with GDP 
growth in Q3 2016 in line with its recent performance, is expected to 
result in full-year GDP growth in 2016 of 2.0% (based on the latest 
average of economic forecasts).27 Consumer spending has been the 
main impetus behind growth this year, given weakness in investment 
and net trade (exports minus imports).  
 
In 2017 the outlook is less favourable. As noted earlier, the fall in the 
pound is expected to lead to higher inflation. This is expected to result 
in consumers’ purchasing power being eroded and, in turn, consumer 
                                                                                             
26  Bank of England, Inflation Report, November 2016, p21 
27  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
November 2016 
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spending growth slowing. The investment outlook is also uncertain and 
unlikely to provide a boost to growth next year. 
Sterling’s decline, however, could help to boost exports, with the price 
of UK products now cheaper internationally. In addition, higher import 
prices are likely to result in weaker demand for imports. The 
combination of these two factors could lead to net exports contributing 
to GDP growth in 2017. 
Forecasts for GDP growth in 2017 were downgraded sharply following 
the EU referendum (see chart below). They have since improved 
somewhat in light of more upbeat recent economic data, but still 
remain well below pre-referendum expectations. Of course, forecasts 
are prone to change particularly in uncertain times such as these. 
 
Against this backdrop of projected weaker growth, there are indications 
that the Government may announce policies in the Autumn Statement 
to boost economic activity. Additional spending on infrastructure has 
been mentioned, with the Chancellor noting that road and rail 
investments could be targets for investment (see section 4).28 In 
addition, the Government has signalled that existing fiscal targets 
should be more flexible, providing scope for additional investment (see 
section 3).29 
Nevertheless, any potential stimulus may be constrained by the impact 
of lower growth forecasts on the public finances, with government 
borrowing already at high levels historically. As such, any stimulus is 
unlikely to be large. For more on infrastructure and the potential for 
fiscal stimulus see section 4. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
28  For example, in the Chancellor’s Conference Speech, and to the Lords Economic 
Affairs Committee 
29  Telegraph, Hammond warns of Britain’s economy heading for post-Brexit 
rollercoaster, 3 October 2016 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
2017 GDP growth forecasts fell sharply after the referendum
Consensus forecast for full-year 2017 GDP growth (%)
Month forecast made
Source: HM Treasury survey of independent forecasts
2016
The latest average 
2017 GDP growth 
forecast of 1.1% is 
lower than before 
the referendum. 
 
There is potential 
for a limited 
Government 
stimulus 
programme. 
 
17 Commons Library Briefing, 18 November 2016 
 
Box 1.1: International comparisons of GDP growth 
Based on the most recent IMF forecasts, made in October, the UK is expected to have the highest GDP 
growth rate among G7 economies in 2016 at 1.8%, slightly higher than Germany at 1.7% and the US 
at 1.6%. In 2017, the UK’s forecast growth rate of 1.1% is above only Japan and Italy.30 
 
 
1.9 Productivity and longer-term outlook 
Productivity – how much is produced for a given input (such as an 
hour’s work) – is directly linked to living standards, with a country’s 
ability to improve its standard of living over time almost entirely 
dependent on productivity growth. 
Productivity is also crucial in determining the long-term growth rates of 
an economy. In other words, stronger productivity growth leads to 
stronger GDP growth. This, in turn, increases tax revenues and lowers 
government budget deficits. Of course, lower productivity growth 
results in the opposite: lower GDP growth and higher budget deficits. 
Productivity – as measured by output per worker – was growing at its 
historical average rate of around 2% per year in the decade prior to the 
2008/2009 recession. Since then it has stagnated. The level of labour 
productivity in Q3 2016 was only a little higher than it was nearly nine 
years earlier in Q4 2007 (the pre-recession peak level). 
 
                                                                                             
30  IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2016 
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We don’t have a firm understanding as to why this has happened and 
whether this is the ‘new normal’. Most economists expect productivity 
growth to improve back towards its historic trend, but if it doesn’t, the 
implications for the economy, public finances and future living 
standards could be severe.31 
Even with productivity growth expected to improve, the outlook for 
growth in the next few years is weaker than at the time of the Budget 
in March, the last time the OBR published forecasts. The chart below 
shows the average GDP growth forecast of independent economists for 
each year up to 2020.32 Forecasts are noticeably lower now compared 
with those made in February, the last survey prior to the Budget. This 
likely results from the perceived additional uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit weighing on economic growth expectations. 
 
Box 1.2: Forecasting the post-Brexit economy 
The Office for Budget Responsibility will add an additional year to its forecasts, taking the forecast 
period up to 2021/22. This will – assuming that Article 50 is triggered before April 2017 and the UK 
exits within two years – take the forecast period well into a future where the UK is no longer a member 
of the European Union.  
The models the OBR uses to produce its economic forecasts are underpinned by a range of important 
judgements and assumptions. Making these assumptions is difficult at the most ‘normal’ of times, but 
they are much more difficult to make for a future in which it isn’t clear what form the UK’s exit from 
the EU will take.  
While it would be foolhardy to try and guess what the OBR will assume for the UK after Brexit, there 
are things we can say about what the OBR’s forecasts can and cannot do: 
• Legislation requires that the OBR’s forecasts only reflect Government policy. As such, when the 
Government sets out ‘ambitions’ or ‘intentions’ the OBR asks the Treasury to confirm whether they 
represent firm policy. If there is no firm policy the OBR note the ambition or intention as a source of risk 
to the forecast.  
• Legislation requires that the OBR’s forecasts do not consider any policies that are alternatives to 
the Government’s policies. This was why the OBR made no assessment of the potential impact of Brexit 
before the EU referendum. 
These obligations suggest that we should expect one forecast that represents the Government’s firm 
policies – including on Brexit – with anything that isn’t firm policy being noted as a source of risk. 
                                                                                             
31  For more on productivity see the Library Briefing, Productivity in the UK 
32  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
February 2016 and November 2016 
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2. Public finances and the welfare 
cap 
Summary 
Government borrowing: the budget deficit 
In 2015/16 the government had to borrow £76 billion to make up the difference between its 
spending and income. Despite halving since its 2009/10 peak the UK’s borrowing – often 
referred to as the budget deficit – remains large relative to other nations.   
In its last forecast before the EU referendum, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – the 
UK’s fiscal watchdog – forecast that borrowing would fall in each year before a surplus was 
reached in 2019/20. Forecasts published since the EU referendum, by other forecasters, 
suggest borrowing will fall more slowly than the OBR had thought. 
The Chancellor is set to change the Government’s target for borrowing in the Autumn 
Statement. He has said that it wouldn’t be sensible to pursue the target of reaching a budget 
surplus in 2019/20 given the uncertainty the economy faces following the EU referendum 
result. See section 3 for more on this.  
Government debt 
At over 80% of GDP, public sector net debt – largely the stock of borrowing arising from past 
deficits – remains relatively high by recent and international standards. Forecasts made since 
the EU referendum have cast some doubt over whether the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall in each 
of the next five years. In March 2016 the OBR forecast that the debt-to-GDP ratio would fall 
each year.   
Welfare cap 
The welfare cap sets a limit on the amount that can be spent on certain benefits. It excludes 
Jobseeker’s Allowance and the state pension. The OBR will assess performance against the 
cap alongside the Autumn Statement. In its last formal assessment – at Autumn Statement 
2015 – the OBR said that the cap would be breached in three of the following five years.  
2.1 The deficit: public sector net borrowing 
Borrowing has halved since its recent peak 
When the government spends more than it receives in tax and other 
revenues it needs to borrow to cover the difference. This borrowing is 
known as ‘public sector net borrowing’, but is often referred to as the 
deficit.  
Borrowing has fallen considerably since the high levels it reached during 
the financial crisis. Borrowing has more than halved since its peak of 
£155 billion in 2009/10, falling to £76 billion in 2015/16; this level of 
borrowing is equivalent to 4.0% of GDP.33   
Before the EU referendum in March 2016, the OBR forecast that 
borrowing would fall each year before reaching a surplus in 2019/20. 
                                                                                             
33  These figures are in nominal terms. Borrowing as a share of GDP is shown in the 
chart. All public sector figures exclude public sector banks. 
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Recent forecasts suggest that borrowing may fall 
more slowly than the OBR forecast 
Forecasts made since the EU referendum, by the likes of the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS) – an economic think tank – have suggested that 
borrowing may fall more slowly than the OBR forecast in March 2016.  
Forecasters have, following the EU referendum, reassessed the outlook 
for the UK economy with the majority expecting economic growth to be 
lower in the coming years (see section 1.8). Lower economic growth 
and other changes to the economy are expected to slow the rate at 
which borrowing will fall.34  
The IFS have forecast higher borrowing than in the OBR’s March 
forecast in all years up to 2019/20. They estimate borrowing in 2019/20 
of £15 billion; a deterioration of £25 billion compared with the £10 
billion surplus forecast by the OBR.  
 
The Resolution Foundation – a think tank – forecast a level of borrowing 
similar to the IFS in 2019/20.35 
                                                                                             
34  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
October 2016 
35  Any reference in this section to the IFS or the Resolution Foundation refers to these 
publications: IFS. Winter is Coming: The outlook for the public finances in the 2016 
Autumn Statement, November 2016; Resolution Foundation, Pressing the reset 
button: The public finance options facing the new Chancellor at the Autumn 
Statement, October 2016  
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UK borrowing remains relatively high by 
international standards 
Despite decreases in recent years, the UK’s borrowing remains relatively 
high by international standards. The IMF – who use a slightly different 
measure of governments’ net borrowing – forecast that UK government 
borrowing will be 3.3% of GDP in 2016, higher than the European 
Union average of 2.1% or the average for advanced economies of 3% 
of GDP.36  
 
Box 2.1: Borrowing is falling more slowly in 2016/17 than the OBR forecast 
Provisional data on borrowing has been published for the first 6 months of 2016/17.37 The data shows 
that borrowing in the current financial year has not been falling as quickly as the OBR had expected.  
 
For the OBR’s forecast for 2016/17 to be met 
borrowing needs to fall by £20.5 billion 
compared with 2015/16. However, borrowing 
in the first half of 2016/17 is only £2.3 billion 
lower than during the same period of 
2015/16.  
 
This data has lead the OBR to say that their 
forecast for 2016/17 is “very unlikely to be 
met”.38 Slower than forecast growth in tax 
receipts – particularly for PAYE39 income tax, 
NICs40 and Stamp Duty Land Tax – has been 
identified as the main contributory factor.  
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates that borrowing may be around £5 billion higher in 2016/17 
than the OBR forecast in March 2016. The median amongst forecasters surveyed by the Treasury is for 
over £10 billion of additional borrowing in 2016/17 compared with the OBR’s forecast.41  The OBR’s 
forecast was for £55.5 billion of borrowing in 2016/17. 
 
The Office for National Statistics will publish Public Sector Finances for October 2016 on 22 November. 
The Library will summarise the key data in our briefing Public Finances: Key Economic Indicators. 
                                                                                             
36  IMF. World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016 
37  ONS. Public sector finances: Sept 2016, 21 October 2016 
38  OBR. Commentary on the Public Sector Finances release: September 2016, 21 
October 2016 
39  Pay-as-you-earn 
40  National Insurance contributions 
41  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
November 2016, Table 3 
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The Government is no longer targeting a surplus in 
2019/20 
In the Summer Budget 2015 the Government introduced a target for 
borrowing to reach a surplus in 2019/20. Following the EU referendum 
result, the previous Chancellor – George Osborne MP – said that the 
Government would no longer be pursuing this target.42 His successor, 
Philip Hammond MP, confirmed this once in post.43  
The current Chancellor said that it wouldn’t be sensible to aim for a 
surplus in 2019/20 given the uncertainty the economy faces following 
the EU referendum result. 44 Further details are set to be announced in 
the Autumn Statement (see section 3 for more on the fiscal targets).    
2.2 Other ways to assess government 
borrowing 
Government borrowing can be assessed using measures other than 
public sector net borrowing. For instance, the current budget deficit 
considers the government’s day-to-day spending alongside its income, 
while structural borrowing looks at the persistent element of borrowing 
that is unrelated to the economic cycle.   
The current budget deficit 
The current budget deficit is the difference between government 
current spending – day-to-day spending on running public services, 
grants and administration – and revenues. It doesn’t include investment 
spending and therefore is said to measure the degree to which 
taxpayers meet the cost of paying for the services provided to them.  
The current budget deficit was £43 billion in 2015/16, equivalent to 
2.3% of GDP. It has fallen by close to three-fifths since its post-financial 
crisis peak of £103 billion in 2009/10.  
In March 2016 the OBR forecast that a surplus would be reached on the 
current budget in 2018/19. In a forecast made since the EU referendum, 
the IFS suggest 2019/20 is the more probable year for the current 
budget to reach surplus.  
Opposition parties have proposed targets for the public finances that 
focus on the current budget, rather than public sector net borrowing.45 
Focusing on the current budget would allow borrowing for investment 
purposes.  
                                                                                             
42  ‘Osborne abandons 2020 budget surplus target’, BBC, 1 July 2016; HC Deb. 4 July 
2016:c622 
43  Philip Hammond’s speech to 2016 Conservative Party Conference, 3 October 2016 
44  Treasury Committee The work of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 19 October 
2016, HC 777, Q94 
45  HC Deb. 20 July 2016:c904-905; Liberal Democrats: 2015 Manifesto; SNP, What do 
the SNP propose as an alternative to austerity? 
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Structural borrowing 
Structural borrowing is the level of borrowing we would expect to 
remain if the economy was running at a normal, sustainable level of 
employment and activity. Structural elements are the underlying or 
persistent part of government borrowing, which are unrelated to the 
economic cycle. 
The OBR never know what the economy’s normal level is, so they 
estimate it through the output gap (see Box 2.1). The OBR estimated 
the output gap to be 0.3% of GDP in 2015/16; that is, the economy 
was thought to be running 0.3% below normal capacity.  
As the economy was thought to be running slightly below capacity in 
2015/16, the OBR judged the structural deficit to be a little lower than 
overall borrowing. The remaining part of overall borrowing was thought 
to be cyclical – related to the economic cycle – which should disappear 
as the economy returns to a normal level of activity.  
  
Box 2.1: The output gap 
The difference between the actual level of economic output and what could be achieved if the 
economy was operating at full potential is known as the ‘output gap’.  
A negative output gap suggests that the economy is operating below its potential level and has idle 
resources. A positive output gap suggests that the economy is operating above potential or 
overheating. 
A big problem for policymakers is that the level of potential output cannot be directly measured and 
consequently neither can the output gap. Therefore economists must estimate what the output gap is.  
The OBR estimates that the output gap was close to -4% of GDP in 2009/10 and is currently around  
-0.3% of GDP. 
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2.3 Public sector net debt 
Public sector net debt is the overall level of government indebtedness, 
built up over many years. Broadly speaking it is the stock of borrowing 
arising from past deficits.  
Before the financial crisis, public sector net debt was around 36-37% of 
GDP.  As a result of the crisis, debt increased sharply and was close to 
84% of GDP at the end of 2015/16, a debt to GDP ratio not seen since 
the mid to late 1960s.46  
In March 2016 the OBR forecast that the UK’s debt to GDP ratio would 
fall in 2016/17, and continue to fall over the following four years of its 
forecast. Forecasts made since the EU referendum by the IFS, Resolution 
Foundation and the economists at the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research47 suggest that this may not be the case. 
 
By international standards the UK’s net debt is relatively high. The IMF – 
who produce data using a slightly different measure of debt – forecast 
that the UK’s general government net debt in 2016 will be 80% of 
GDP. The IMF forecast that the UK’s net debt will be higher than the EU 
average of 66% and higher than the average amongst advanced 
economies of 72% of GDP.48 
 
                                                                                             
46  OBR. Public finances databank, October 2016 
47  National Institute Economic Review No. 238 November 2016, Prospects for the UK 
economy, Table A8 
48  IMF. World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016 
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2.4 The welfare cap 
The welfare cap was introduced in Budget 2014 and sets a limit on the 
amount that can be spent on certain benefits, including tax credits, 
incapacity benefit and most housing benefit. It excludes Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and the state pension.49 
The cap covers each year of the forecast period – currently 2016/17 to 
2020/21 – and is set according to the OBR’s forecast for welfare 
spending in scope. The OBR will report alongside the Autumn 
Statement 2016 on whether the cap has been met or exceeded in each 
of these years. 
At the time of Autumn Statement 2015, the OBR assessed that relevant 
welfare spending would breach the cap in three of the following five 
years, following the cancellation of changes to tax credits that had been 
proposed in the Summer Budget 2015.50 The cap was comprehensively 
breached – by around £2 billion a year – in 2016/17 and the following 
two years. The Government’s response to this was to ‘justify’ the breach 
to Parliament, rather than take action to remedy the situation,51 which 
led the Institute for Fiscal Studies to question the efficacy of the cap.52  
The Government announced in the 2016 Budget that its intention is for 
the cap to be met by the end of the Parliament according to the OBR’s 
assessment that will accompany the Autumn Statement 2016.53 
The OBR’s forecasts for the 2016 Budget (see below) showed the cap 
being breached in all years of the forecast period. This didn’t represent a 
formal assessment. The OBR is only required to assess the Government’s 
performance against the cap formally at each Autumn Statement. 
 
                                                                                             
49  HM Treasury, Budget 2014, March 2014, para 1.76, p26 
50  OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, November 2015, pp 192,193 
51  HC Deb. 16 December 2015:c1633-1650 
52  IFS, 2016 Green Budget, February 2016, p74 
53  HM Treasury, Budget 2016, March 2016, para 1.70, p26 
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3. Revising the fiscal targets 
Summary 
The Government has three targets for the public finances – often referred to as fiscal targets. 
The targets are designed to guide decisions affecting the public finances. The Chancellor is set 
to drop, or amend, at least one of the fiscal targets in the Autumn Statement.  
The target for borrowing had been for a budget surplus to be reached in 2019/20. Following 
the EU referendum result the Government will no longer be pursuing this target. The 
Chancellor, Phillip Hammond MP, says that following the target is no longer sensible given the 
uncertainty the economy faces following the EU referendum result.  
The Chancellor has not said anything definitive on what the new targets might be. However, 
he has discussed some wider objectives for fiscal policy that the targets might reflect. The 
Chancellor: still wants to seek a budget surplus in the future; wants to control day-to-day 
spending and debt; and may seek to find ‘headroom’ for a fiscal stimulus if the economy 
needs one. A fiscal stimulus would see the government increase spending or reduce taxes 
with the aim of stimulating economic growth.  
The Chancellor may also take the opportunity to reassess the other fiscal targets – for debt 
and welfare spending – in the Autumn Statement. Both targets were being breached in the 
OBR’s latest assessments. 
 
3.1 Background 
Both the Coalition Government and Conservative Government have 
operated targets for the public finances – often referred to as fiscal 
targets. The targets are designed to guide decisions affecting the public 
finances. 
The targets have been changed at various points.54 The current target 
for borrowing, introduced by the Conservative Government in the 2015 
Summer Budget, requires a budget surplus to be reached in 2019/20 
(see Box 3.1). This ‘interim fiscal mandate’ would have the government 
spending less than it receives from taxes and other revenues in 2019/20, 
thus eliminating the deficit. 
Following the EU referendum vote, the previous Chancellor, George 
Osborne MP, said that the Government would no longer be pursuing 
the 2019/20 surplus target.55 The current Chancellor, Philip Hammond 
MP, and the Prime Minister have since confirmed this;56 although both 
have said that they are not abandoning the intention to move to surplus 
in the future.  
                                                                                             
54  See Annex 1 of Library briefing Office for Budget Responsibility and the Charter for 
Budget Responsibility for details of previous fiscal rules. Table 5.1 in the 
aforementioned IFS report covers targets from previous administrations. 
55  ‘Osborne abandons 2020 budget surplus target’, BBC, 1 July 2016; HC Deb. 4 July 
2016:c622 
56  House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Chancellor of the Exchequer Oral 
Evidence, 8 September 2016; HC Deb 20 July 2016:c818-819 
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The current Chancellor has said that it is more sensible to change the 
target rather than “squeezing a slowing economy to deliver a fiscal 
surplus target”.57  
Dropping the 2019/20 budget surplus target has not proved particularly 
controversial. There was doubt that the target was achievable, and 
ending the inflexible target to give the government greater flexibility to 
deal with a changing economy has been welcomed. 58 
 
The Chancellor is set to announce details of new fiscal targets at the 
Autumn Statement. New targets for borrowing seem likely. The 
Chancellor may also take the opportunity to reassess the Government’s 
other fiscal targets – the debt and welfare targets – both of which were 
being breached in the OBR’s latest assessments.  
 
Box 3.1: The Government’s fiscal targets 
The fiscal targets that were introduced in the 2015 Summer Budget are shown below. These targets are 
included in the Charter for Budget Responsibility; if the Government wishes to change the targets this 
Charter will have to be revised.   
See section 2 for more on the public finances.  
The fiscal mandate 
The Government’s interim fiscal mandate is for public sector net borrowing to be in surplus by 2019/20. 
A surplus will be achieved if government spending is less than the taxes and receipts it receives. Once a 
surplus has been reached the target is for a surplus to be achieved in every year when the economy is in 
‘normal times’.  
Supplementary debt target 
Until 2019/20 the fiscal mandate will be supplemented with a target for the public sector net debt-to-
GDP ratio to fall each year. 
Normal times 
The above targets will apply unless the OBR assess that there has been a significant negative shock. If 
annual real growth in the UK economy is less than 1% the OBR will judge there to have been a 
significant negative shock, and the economy will be out of normal times.  
If the OBR judges that a negative shock has occurred, or will occur over the forecast period, the fiscal 
targets will be suspended. The Treasury must then set out a plan to return the budget to surplus 
including temporary fiscal targets. The plan must be approved by a vote in the House of Commons.  
Cap on welfare 
The welfare cap sets a limit on the amount that can be spent on certain benefits including tax credits, 
incapacity benefit and most housing benefit. It excludes Job Seekers Allowance, Universal Credit and 
the state pension. The level of the cap is set by the Treasury for each year of the five years that the OBR 
produces forecasts for – often referred to as the forecast period.  
The OBR's latest judgement 
Twice a year – alongside the Budget and Autumn Statement – the OBR judges whether the 
Government is more likely than not to meet the fiscal mandate and supplementary debt target. In 
March 2016, the OBR judged the Government to be on course to meet the fiscal mandate, but not the 
supplementary debt target. The debt target was not met as the OBR expected the debt-to-GDP ratio to 
increase between 2014/15 and 2015/16.  
                                                                                             
57  Treasury Committee, Oral evidence: The work of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, 19 October 2016, HC 777, q94 
58  IFS, post-Budget 2016 introductory remarks, 17 March 2016 ‘Businesses welcome 
Hammond’s plans to ditch budget surplus targets', The Telegraph, 3 October 2016; 
‘George Osborne scraps 2020 budget surplus plan’, The Guardian, 1 July 2016; 
‘Rethinking the public finances - Plan B’, The Economist, 8 October 2016; IFS 
Newspaper Article, If Hammond hits reset, it won’t mean Osborne got it wrong, 26 
July 2016  
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The welfare cap is assessed at the Autumn Statement. At Autumn Statement 2015, the OBR reported 
that the Government had breached the welfare cap. In its March 2016 forecast, the OBR said that 
forecast spending remains above the welfare cap and the breach would still hold. 
Further information on the current and previous fiscal rules can be found in the Library Briefing Paper 
The Office for Budget Responsibility and Charter for Budget Responsibility.59 
 
3.2 Changing the fiscal targets 
The fiscal targets are set out in the Charter for Budget Responsibility 
(the Charter).60 If the Government wishes to change any of the current 
targets it must lay an updated Charter before Parliament, which must 
then be approved by a vote of the House of Commons. It seems likely 
that this is the approach the Chancellor will take to replace the 2019/20 
budget surplus target, and that the Government will publish a revised 
Charter alongside the Autumn Statement.  
An alternative approach does exist, but this approach only becomes 
available if the OBR forecasts economic growth to be sufficiently 
low.61,62 The fiscal targets can be replaced if the OBR forecasts there has 
been a significant negative shock. As Box 3.1 explains, a significant 
negative shock is deemed to have happened if the OBR forecasts that 
annual economic growth will be less than 1% in real terms at any point 
over the next five years.63 If the OBR makes such an assessment the 
Chancellor can review the targets. Any changes made to the targets 
must still be approved by a vote in the House of Commons.  
3.3 What has the Chancellor said about new 
fiscal targets? 
The Chancellor hasn’t laid out any specifics for the new fiscal targets – 
the detail will come in the Autumn Statement.  
While nothing specific about the new targets has been announced, the 
Chancellor has discussed some wider objectives for fiscal policy that the 
targets may reflect.  
Taken overall, the Chancellor’s comments, summarised below, suggest 
that the new targets may focus on the current budget, but include a 
longer-term desire to return to surplus.64 They may also be more 
flexible, not focusing on a particular date, but always looking to a 
rolling period in the future. This was the sort of target that the Coalition 
                                                                                             
59  The Office for Budget Responsibility and Charter for Budget Responsibility, 
Commons Library Briefing Paper, SN05657, 6 November 2015 
60  HM Treasury. The Charter for Budget Responsibility: autumn 2015 update 
61  Of course, the Government could also amend or repeal primary legislation to bring 
to an end the Charter for Budget Responsibility and the targets contained in it. The 
relevant Act is the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011. 
62   This approach is only available for the fiscal mandate and supplementary debt 
target. 
63  A significant negative shock is also deemed to have happened if it real terms 
economic growth was less than 1% in the most recent 4 quarter period or is 
occurring at the time when the OBR is making the assessment.  
64  Resolution Foundation, Pressing the reset button: The public finances options facing 
the new Chancellor at the Autumn Statement, October 2016 
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are set out in the 
Charter for Budget 
Responsibility. 
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of the House of 
Commons.  
 
29 Commons Library Briefing, 18 November 2016 
 
Government used for borrowing, which was recently praised by Paul 
Johnson, Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).65,66 
Controlling public sector debt is a concern for the Chancellor, so there 
may also continue to be a target specifically focused on the debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
Reaching a surplus in the future and controlling debt 
The Chancellor is not abandoning the aim to reach a budget surplus at 
some point, but 2019/20 will no longer be the target date.67 The 
government will therefore still be working to reduce the deficit: “The 
task of fiscal consolidation must continue.”68  
The Chancellor believes that debt needs to be controlled:  
“I suggest that the level of public sector net debt as a ratio of 
GDP that we are at at the moment we are getting quite close to a 
level that might make a difference to the willingness of markets to 
lend to us, so I do not think we should be cavalier about the levels 
of debt”.69 
Room for fiscal stimulus and flexibility 
The Chancellor has said that a new fiscal rule could allow ‘headroom’ to 
deliver a fiscal stimulus, if the economy needed one. That is, the 
Chancellor has suggested that a rule could be designed that would 
allow for increased public spending or reduced taxes if the economy 
required such a stimulus.70 The Chancellor has suggested that this 
flexibility could be built into a new rule whether the headroom is 
required immediately or not.71  
Controlling day-to-day public spending, but allowing for 
investment 
The Chancellor wants to control the government’s day-to-day, or 
current, spending.72 He has also suggested that if fiscal stimulus is 
required it should focus on investment that delivers a short-term 
stimulus and long-term benefits for productivity. A new rule, according 
to the Chancellor, should allow for “high value economic infrastructure 
investment.73 See section 4 for more on infrastructure.  
 
                                                                                             
65  The Coalition Government started with a target for the cyclically-adjusted current 
budget to be in surplus 5 years out. This then got shortened to 3 years out.  
66  P Johnson, “Rip it up and start again: flexibility is key to writing the fiscal rulebook”, 
The Times, 15 November 2016 
67  Treasury Committee, Oral evidence: The work of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, 19 October 2016, HC 777, q94 
68  Philip Hammond’s speech to 2016 Conservative Party Conference, 3 October 2016; 
Treasury Committee, Oral evidence: The work of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, 19 October 2016, HC 777, q102 
69  House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, One-off evidence session with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 8 September 2016 
70  House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, One-off evidence session with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 8 September 2016 
71  ‘Hammond seeks fiscal headroom to react to any Brexit fallout’, FT, 2 November 
2016 
72  Philip Hammond’s speech to 2016 Conservative Party Conference, 3 October 2016; 
BBC Radio 4, Today Programme, 3 October 2016 
73  ‘Chancellor says there will be no infrastructure ‘splurge’’, FT, 7 October 2016 
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4. Infrastructure 
Summary 
The run up to the Autumn Statement has seen calls from economists and industry bodies for 
increased government spending on infrastructure. The Chancellor has indicated that he sees 
the need for some targeted and time limited increases in this sort of spending. 
The motivation for this is partly the historically low cost of government borrowing (despite 
recent rises) and the fact that GDP growth forecasts have been cut recently, particularly for 
2017. Infrastructure spending is seen as an important part of a potential ‘fiscal stimulus’ to 
boost GDP growth in the medium term. A fiscal stimulus would see the government increase 
spending or reduce taxes with the aim of stimulating economic growth. 
Areas of infrastructure that could see increased investment include house building, road and 
rail improvements and flood defences. 
 
The Chancellor has stated that the UK needs more “careful, targeted 
public investment in high value infrastructure”74 and this option has 
been widely discussed ahead of the Autumn Statement. Why has this 
possibility been raised and what has been suggested? 
4.1 Why increase infrastructure spending? 
The World Economic Forum ranks the UK 9th out of 144 countries in 
terms of infrastructure quality, behind France and Germany (7th and 8th), 
but ahead of the US (11th).75  
 
Total investment spending in the 
UK, however, is below the level 
seen in other developed economies. 
The UK invested 17% of GDP in 
2015, compared with 22% in 
France, 20% in the US and 19% in 
Germany. The G7 average was 
20%.76 
 
Box 4.1: A fiscal stimulus? 
Increasing spending or cutting taxes to boost economic growth is known as a ‘fiscal stimulus’. The idea 
has attracted considerable attention in the run up to the Autumn Statement. 
In 2008 and 2009 the then Labour Government introduced a fiscal stimulus in response to the financial 
crisis. This stimulus cut VAT, introduced new infrastructure spending and brought forward already 
planned investment. 
                                                                                             
74  Phillip Hammond, Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 3 October 2016 
75  World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index 2016/17, 2nd Pillar 
76  International Monetary Fund database, Total Investment: Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation, Downloaded November 2016 
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The economic outlook is materially better now compared with in 2008, but GDP forecasts have been 
reduced quite sharply in recent months, particularly for 2017.77 Options for boosting growth in the 
medium term are therefore being widely discussed. 
Oxford Economics estimate that increasing infrastructure spending by 1% of GDP in 2017/18 and 
2018/19 would increase economic growth by up to 1.2% points more than cutting taxes, and by up to 
0.4% points more than increasing other spending by the same amount.78 
The UK Government spent £33 billion or 1.8% of GDP on infrastructure in 2015/16.79 Increasing this 
figure by 1% of GDP is probably beyond the scale of any increase to be announced in the Autumn 
Statement, but the comparatively greater impact of infrastructure spending on growth means some 
increase in this area is possible. 
 
Increased investment in infrastructure also appears attractive at the 
moment because of the relatively low cost of government borrowing. 
Despite recent increases, 10 year government bond yields are still well 
below the level seen before the financial crisis or even a couple of years 
ago. Government bond yields indicate the rate the government can 
expect to pay on new borrowing. If the Government were to accept the 
arguments for increasing infrastructure spending, doing so now would 
incur lower borrowing costs than in previous eras.80 
The Government has also signalled that it will alter the ‘fiscal targets’ 
which guide the Government’s decisions affecting spending and taxes. 
The revised targets may introduce extra scope for increases in 
infrastructure investment (see section 3 for more on the fiscal targets). 
The Financial Times notes that Government officials are looking into the 
possibility of new “infrastructure bonds” which be used to help fund 
infrastructure spending. The bonds are seen as one way that the 
Government might try to mitigate the impact that leaving the EU would 
have on the UK’s access to loans from the European Investment Bank 
(see Box 4.2).81 
  
                                                                                             
77  HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts, 
October 2016  
78  Oxford Economics, UK economic outlook: the UK votes to leave the EU, what 
happens next? September 2016. Cited in Telegraph, Big spender: new Chancellor 
Philip Hammond could splurge on construction, 18 September 2016 
79  ONS, Public Sector Net Investment series: JW2Z 
80  Financial Times, UK sovereign bond yields close to pre-Brexit levels, 10 November 
2016 
81  Financial Times, UK drawing up plans for infrastructure bonds for large projects, 14 
November 2016 
Government 
borrowing costs are 
relatively low. 
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Box 4.2: Brexit, infrastructure spending and the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Founded under the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is directed and 
managed by EU member states and it is tasked with contributing to the “balanced and steady 
development of the internal market in the interest of the Union”.82 The charts below highlight the key 
sectors for EIB lending in the UK as well as the increase in lending commitments over recent years (more 
than doubling between 2012 and 2015.83 
Brian Unwin, a British former President of the EIB, has pointed out the role of the EIB in various large 
scale infrastructure projects, including the Channel tunnel (of which the EIB was the leading financier), 
the second Severn crossing, the Jubilee Line extension to the London Underground network, the 
Heathrow Express and London to Dover fast rail links. Mr Unwin believes that: 
“There is no alternative multilateral institution with the EIB’s lending capacity and 
expertise in infrastructure investment, and proposals to establish a UK equivalent have 
come to nothing.”84 
Reports suggest that the Government may be considering a number of proposals on how to fill a gap in 
infrastructure investment left by the EIB. These include the possibility of the Treasury issuing 
“infrastructure bonds” or the launch of a UK investment bank.85 
Could the EIB still lend to the UK after Brexit? 
EIB lending outside the EU is governed by a series of mandates from the European Union in support of 
EU development and cooperation policies in partner countries. As a result, any continued lending to the 
United Kingdom would have to be unanimously agreed by the EIB’s board of governors (the finance 
ministers). 
 
                                                                                             
82 Article 309 of the Lisbon Treaty 
83 EIB, The EIB in the United Kingdom (accessed on 14 November 2016) 
84 Financial Times, “Brexit Britain will miss cheap EU funds for infrastructure” (11 August 
2016) 
85 Financial Times, “UK drawing up plans for infrastructure bonds for large projects” (14 
November 2016) 
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4.2 What infrastructure spending has been 
suggested? 
The Chancellor has commented that  
If there is a need…to deliver a fiscal stimulus…it has to be well 
designed; it has to be limited in duration and quick in delivering 
effect…86 
This implies that although the Autumn Statement may make reference 
to large-scale projects (such as the third runway at Heathrow, the 
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station and HS2), any new infrastructure 
spending announcements are likely to be smaller in scale and ‘shovel 
ready’, or as the Chancellor has characterised them, “modest, rapidly 
deliverable investments…”87 
The Government also announced measures to build more houses in 
early October, including a £3 billion Home Building Fund which aims to 
“build more than 25,000 new homes this Parliament and up to 200,000 
in the longer term.”88 
The Chancellor has repeatedly mentioned road and rail improvements as 
potential targets for investment.89 Given the flood damage in early 
2016, flood defences are another likely candidate for improvement. 
The Government’s Infrastructure Pipeline features a number of other 
smaller projects which are due to begin work in 2018/19 or later which 
could potentially be brought forward. These include station upgrades 
across the country, a river crossing in London and motorway expansion 
in the North East of England.90 
 
 
                                                                                             
86  House of Lords Economic Affairs Select committee, Oral evidence from Rt. Hon. 
Philip Hammond MP, 8 September 2016 
87  Ibid 
88  Department for Communities and Local Government, Press Release: Let’s get Britain 
building, 4 October 2016 
89  For example, in the Chancellor’s Conference Speech, and to the Lords Economic 
Affairs Committee 
90  HM Treasury, National Infrastructure Pipeline Spring 2016, April 2016 
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Appendix 1: Sources of further 
information 
Library’s Brexit briefings 
The Library has produced a range of briefings. The briefings, and other 
relevant parliamentary material, are pulled together in our EU 
referendum hub.  
Section 6 of Productivity in the UK looks at the channels through which 
Brexit can affect future productivity – and growth – prospects. 
HM Treasury 
Budget 2016 
Autumn Statement and Spending Review 2015 
Summer Budget 2015 
Budget 2015 
Office for Budget Responsibility 
Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2016 
Economic and fiscal outlook, November 2015 
Monthly commentary on the public finances 
Public finance databank 
Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Post-Budget Briefing 2016 
Post-Spending Review and Autumn Statement Briefing 2015 
Post-Summer Budget Briefing 2015 
Green Budget 2016 
Commentary on the September 2016 public finances 
House of Commons Library 
Economic indicators (an edition will be published on 22 November 
2016) 
House of Lords Library 
2016 Budget: Overview and Reactions 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
Inquiry into Budget 2016 
Inquiry into Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
Inquiry into Summer Budget 2015 
Inquiry into Budget 2015 
Report on Autumn Statement 2014 
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Appendix 2: Economic and public 
finance data 1979-2021 
 
Economic data, 1979-2020
Real GDP Inflation Inflation ILO
growth RPI CPI Unemployment
% % % Q4, %
1979 3.7% 13.4% .. 5.5%
1980 -2.0% 18.0% .. 8.0%
1981 -0.8% 11.9% .. 10.2%
1982 2.0% 8.6% .. 11.1%
1983 4.2% 4.6% .. 11.7%
1984 2.3% 5.0% .. 11.6%
1985 4.2% 6.1% .. 11.3%
1986 3.2% 3.4% .. 11.3%
1987 5.4% 4.2% .. 9.7%
1988 5.8% 4.9% .. 8.0%
1989 2.6% 7.8% 5.2% 7.0%
1990 0.7% 9.5% 7.0% 7.5%
1991 -1.1% 5.9% 7.5% 9.5%
1992 0.4% 3.7% 4.3% 10.4%
1993 2.5% 1.6% 2.5% 10.3%
1994 3.9% 2.4% 2.0% 9.0%
1995 2.5% 3.5% 2.6% 8.3%
1996 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 7.8%
1997 3.1% 3.1% 1.8% 6.5%
1998 3.2% 3.4% 1.6% 6.1%
1999 3.3% 1.5% 1.3% 5.8%
2000 3.7% 3.0% 0.8% 5.2%
2001 2.7% 1.8% 1.2% 5.2%
2002 2.4% 1.7% 1.3% 5.1%
2003 3.5% 2.9% 1.4% 4.9%
2004 2.5% 3.0% 1.3% 4.7%
2005 3.0% 2.8% 2.1% 5.1%
2006 2.5% 3.2% 2.3% 5.5%
2007 2.6% 4.3% 2.3% 5.2%
2008 -0.6% 4.0% 3.6% 6.4%
2009 -4.3% -0.5% 2.2% 7.8%
2010 1.9% 4.6% 3.3% 7.9%
2011 1.5% 5.2% 4.5% 8.4%
2012 1.3% 3.2% 2.8% 7.8%
2013 1.9% 3.0% 2.6% 7.2%
2014 3.1% 2.4% 1.5% 5.7%
2015 2.2% 1.0% 0.0% 5.1%
2016 2.0% 1.7% 0.7% 4.9%
2017 2.2% 2.4% 1.6% 5.1%
2018 2.1% 3.2% 2.0% 5.2%
2019 2.1% 3.2% 2.1% 5.3%
2020 2.1% 3.2% 2.0% 5.4%
Sources: ONS (series, IHYP, CZBH, D7G7, MGSX)
OBR, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2016, Table 3.8, and Economy Supplementary Tables 1.6 & 1.7
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Public finance data 1979-80 to 2020-21
Structural
Public sector net borrowing deficit Public sector net debt
£ billion % GDP % GDP £ billion % GDP
1979/80 8.5 3.7% 4.0% 98.2 45.0%
1980/81 11.5 4.3% 2.9% 113.8 45.6%
1981/82 6.0 2.0% -0.1% 125.2 45.3%
1982/83 8.5 2.6% 0.6% 132.5 43.9%
1983/84 11.8 3.3% 2.0% 143.6 43.6%
1984/85 12.5 3.3% 2.8% 157.0 44.3%
1985/86 9.0 2.1% 2.1% 162.5 41.7%
1986/87 8.4 1.9% 2.0% 167.8 40.1%
1987/88 4.7 0.9% 2.1% 167.4 35.6%
1988/89 -6.0 -1.1% 1.0% 153.7 29.3%
1989/90 -0.6 -0.1% 1.3% 151.9 26.2%
1990/91 6.2 0.9% 0.7% 151.1 24.2%
1991/92 23.0 3.3% 1.9% 165.8 25.2%
1992/93 47.1 6.5% 4.8% 201.9 29.0%
1993/94 51.6 6.7% 5.4% 249.8 33.9%
1994/95 43.8 5.4% 4.6% 290.0 37.5%
1995/96 35.3 4.2% 2.9% 322.1 39.2%
1996/97 27.7 3.1% 2.7% 347.0 37.3%
1997/98 5.9 0.6% 1.8% 358.6 37.1%
1998/99 -4.4 -0.4% 0.9% 357.8 35.3%
1999/00 -14.4 -1.4% 0.0% 349.3 32.7%
2000/01 -17.2 -1.6% -0.4% 316.7 28.5%
2001/02 0.5 0.0% 0.7% 323.1 27.9%
2002/03 26.7 2.2% 2.3% 356.2 29.1%
2003/04 31.5 2.5% 2.8% 391.0 30.3%
2004/05 43.6 3.3% 3.9% 446.5 32.9%
2005/06 41.1 2.9% 3.5% 487.2 33.9%
2006/07 36.6 2.5% 3.0% 523.6 34.6%
2007/08 40.5 2.6% 3.7% 554.4 35.3%
2008/09 104.0 6.7% 6.6% 763.8 50.2%
2009/10 154.9 10.1% 8.0% 1,006.9 64.6%
2010/11 136.8 8.6% 6.6% 1,151.7 71.3%
2011/12 115.5 7.1% 5.2% 1,246.6 75.2%
2012/13 123.4 7.3% 5.3% 1,357.5 78.8%
2013/14 104.0 5.9% 4.4% 1,460.1 80.9%
2014/15 96.3 5.2% 4.4% 1,548.5 83.3%
2015/16 76.0 4.0% 3.8% 1,602.8 84.0%
2016/17 55.5 2.9% 2.7% 1,638.4 82.6%
2017/18 38.8 1.9% 1.9% 1,676.9 81.3%
2018/19 21.4 1.0% 1.0% 1,715.3 79.9%
2019/20 -10.4 -0.5% -0.5% 1,724.8 77.2%
2020/21 -11.0 -0.5% -0.5% 1,739.9 74.7%
Source: OBR, ONS
Note: figures exclude public sector banks
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